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MTSUN, LLC v. Mont. Dep’t of Pub. Serv. Regulation, 472 P.3d 1154
(Mont. 2020)
Ryan W. Frank
I. INTRODUCTION
MTSUN, LLC (“MTSUN”) initiated negotiations for a power
purchase agreement (“PPA”) with NorthWestern Energy (“NorthWestern”)
in September 2015 for a potential solar energy facility in eastern Montana.1
In December 2016, at an impasse in contract negotiations with
NorthWestern, MTSUN filed a petition with the Montana Public Service
Commission (“PSC”) requesting that the agency exercise its statutory
authority to set the terms of the contract for the proposed project. 2
Following MTSUN’s petition, the PSC issued a series of orders and
reconsiderations which ultimately reconfigured the entirety of the
agreement, including the terms that the parties had previously agreed
upon.3 After exhausting its administrative remedies, MTSUN challenged
the PSC’s orders in the Eighth Judicial District Court, Cascade County
alleging that the PSC violated the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act
(“PURPA”), Montana’s mini-PURPA (“mini-PURPA”), and the PSC’s
own precedent in establishing the terms of the PPA.4 MTSUN, LLC. v.
Mont. Dep’t of Pub. Serv. Regulation provides some insight into the PSC
(one of the lesser-known state agencies) and the future of renewable
energy in Montana.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
In establishing the legal framework, the Montana Supreme Court
relied heavily on Vote Solar v. Mont. Dep’t of Pub. Serv. Regulation,5 a
similar case it decided less than one month before its MTSUN decision.6
Understanding these two important cases requires a foundational
understanding of PURPA, mini-PURPA, PSC precedent, and the Montana
Administrative Procedures Act (“MAPA”).
A. PURPA
The United States Congress enacted PURPA in 1978 to promote
the development of renewable energy. 7 Importantly, PURPA mandates
1.
MTSUN, LLC v. Mont. Dep’t of Pub. Serv. Regulation, 472
P.3d 1154, 1159 (Mont. 2020).
2.
Id.
3.
Id. at 1162.
4.
Id. at 1166.
5.
473 P.3d 963 (Mont. 2020).
6.
MTSUN, 472 P.3d at 1158.
7.
Vote Solar, 473 P.3d at 966 (citing 16 U.S.C § 824a-3
(2018)).
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that large electric utilities acquire energy from small qualifying facilities
(“QFs”) “at standard-offer rates.”8 Under PURPA, small power QFs are
those facilities with a capacity equal to or less than 80 megawatts (“MW”)
that generate energy from renewable sources, such as solar.9
PURPA requires that rates are: (1) reasonable to electricity
ratepayers (consumers); and (2) non-discriminatory to QFs in order to
promote renewable energy development.10 PURPA’s regulations expressly
state that a rate equal to the avoided costs satisfies these requirements;11
thus, a utility can purchase energy from a QF at the avoided cost rate. The
rate a QF receives is equivalent to the utility’s avoided costs, which are
the costs a utility would have incurred if the utility produced the electricity
itself or purchased it from a provider other than the QF.12 The avoided
costs method balances the ratepayer’s interests with the renewable energy
sector’s interests.13 Avoided costs can be further sub-divided into avoidedenergy and avoided-capacity costs. 14 Energy costs are the direct costs
associated with producing the energy, 15 whereas capacity costs are the
costs associated with storing and delivering the energy. 16 The Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”), the federal agency tasked with
implementing PURPA, directs utilities to submit capacity costs with
energy costs for new facilities.17 By considering both energy and capacity
costs, the avoided costs encompass “the lower energy costs that might be
associated with the new capacity.”18
PURPA allows for the creation of a legally-enforceable obligation
(“LEO”).19 Although it is not technically a contract, the Court states a LEO
is a binding commitment that effectively requires both a QF to sell and an
electric utility to purchase produced energy.20 Regarding its policy purpose,
the LEO “‘prevent[s] an electric utility from avoiding its PURPA
obligation by refusing to sign a contract,’ or from ‘delaying the signing of
a contract,’ so that ‘a later and lower avoided cost is applicable.’”21 To
8.
Id. (citing 18 C.F.R §§ 292.201, 292.203–.204 (2020)
(emphasis added)).
9.
Id.
10.
Id. (citing 18 C.F.R. § 292.304(a)).
11.
18 C.F.R. § 292.304(b)).
12.
Vote Solar, 473 P.3d at 966.
13.
Id. (See Southern California Edison Company San Diego
Gas & Electric Company, Commission Opinion, No. EL95-16-001, 1995
WL 327268 (FERC June 2, 1995) (Purchasing energy at the avoided cost
rate means the rate at which the utility would pay for that energy if it
produced it itself or purchased it from another supplier. Therefore, the
consumer pays the same rate).
14.
Id.
15.
Id.
16.
Id.
17.
Id. at 966–67.
18.
Id. at 967.
19.
MTSUN, LLC v. Mont. Dep’t of Pub. Serv. Regulation, 472
P.3d 1154, 1158–59 (Mont. 2020).
20.
Id. at 1159.
21.
Id. at 1171.
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further this purpose, reviewing courts look to the commitment of the QF
rather than actions by the utility so that the utility and QF are equally
committed.22 Under PURPA regulations, the avoided cost rate for a QF is
determined at the time parties establish a LEO.23 Importantly, FERC stated
that a LEO is created either at the time the QF and utility execute a contract,
or at the time that a QF petitions its state utility commission due to some
unnecessary delay or a utility’s refusal to execute the agreement.24
Although it does not provide a specific contract length for QFs,
PURPA requires public utilities to encourage long-term contracts,
consistent with its underlying purpose.25 Per the court, long-term contracts
improve the economic viability for QFs and their projects.26
B. Mini-PURPA & the PSC’s Precedent
Montana adopted and enacted its version of PURPA, known as
mini-PURPA, in 1981. 27 Like its federal predecessor, mini-PURPA
promotes the economic viability of QFs in Montana. 28 In Montana, the
PSC is the agency tasked with implementing mini-PURPA.29
Three areas of PSC precedent are pertinent here: (1) avoided-cost
rates; (2) carbon adders; and (3) contract lengths. In calculating avoidedcost rates, historically, the PSC has used the proxy method. Under the
proxy method, utilities base their avoided-cost calculation on “the
projected capacity and energy costs of the utility’s next planned resource
additions.”30 The proxy method assumes that the purchase of energy from
the QF, in theory, allows the utility to postpone construction of its next
resource addition because it is able to source the energy from another
facility at the same rate.31 In calculating the capacity contribution, another
avoided-cost consideration, the PSC has typically considered the hours an
avoided-capacity facility is actually performing.32
Since 2012, the PSC has included carbon adder, a tool for
incorporating environmental costs, in its calculation of avoided-cost
rates.33 The PSC approved this practice for hydroelectric QFs in 2014 and
for small wind QFs in 2017.34

22.
Id. at 1159.
23.
Id. (quoting 18 C.F.R § 292.304(d)(2)(ii) (2020)).
24.
Id. (citing Cedar Creek Wind, LLC, Commission Opinion,
No. EL11-59-000, 2011 WL 4710848 (FERC Oct. 4, 2011).
25.
Vote Solar v. Mont. Dep’t of Pub. Serv. Regulation, 473
P.3d 963, 967 (Mont. 2020).
26.
Id.
27.
Id.
28.
Id. at 967–68.
29.
Id. at 967.
30.
Id. at 968.
31.
Id.
32.
Id. at 969.
33.
Id.
34.
Id.
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The PSC has historically allowed NorthWestern to enter into longterm contracts with QFs without interference. 35 Directly preceding the
issuance of its 2015 resource procurement plan, NorthWestern entered into
seven 25-year contracts with wind, solar, and hydroelectric QFs.36
C. MAPA
MAPA provides the appropriate standards of review for
administrative agency decision appeals. 37 MAPA allows the reviewing
court to “reverse or modify an agency decision” when the decision
“exceeds its statutory authority, is affected by legal error, clearly
erroneous in light of the whole record, arbitrary or capricious, or
characterized by an abuse of discretion” and the decision affects the rights
of a party. 38 The courts give a certain level of deference to agency
decisions to account for the agency’s expertise in the area if the decision
provides “a rational connection between the facts found and the choice
made.”39
III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
MTSUN proposed an “80 MW single-axis tracking solar energy
project” in eastern Montana.40 In September 2015, seeking a buyer for its
produced energy, MTSUN initiated discussions with NorthWestern, an
electric utility in Montana.41 Following initial correspondence between the
parties, MTSUN was unable to contact NorthWestern despite its repeated
attempts.42 This period of prolonged silence continued for approximately
six months before MTSUN filed an informal complaint with the PSC
alleging that NorthWestern’s silence violated PURPA.43
Following the complaint, NorthWestern resumed contact and
contract negotiations continued between the parties.44 Between May 13,
2016, and November 30, 2016, MTSUN received six avoided cost
estimates from NorthWestern. 45 These avoided cost estimates from
NorthWestern fluctuated significantly from one estimate to another as
displayed in the variance from the first avoided cost estimate to the

35.
Id.
36.
Id.
37.
MTSUN, LLC v. Mont. Dep’t of Pub. Serv. Regulation, 472
P.3d 1154, 1168 (Mont. 2020).
38.
Id. at 1169 (citing MONT CODE ANN. §§ 2-4-702, 69-3-402
(2019)).
39.
Id. (citing Mont. Envtl. Info. Ctr. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality,
451 P.3d 493, 501 (Mont. 2019)).
40.
Id. at 1159.
41.
Id.
42.
Id.
43.
Id. at 1159–60.
44.
Id. at 1160.
45.
Id. at 1160–61.
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second.46 NorthWestern pegged its first avoided cost estimate at $46.64
per megawatt hour (“MWh”) and its second at $35.48/MWh.47 The sixth
and final avoided cost estimate came in at $43.48/MWh after a series of
back and forth negotiations between the parties in which NorthWestern,
on two occasions, claimed to have made an error in its avoided cost
calculations. 48 The parties essentially agreed to terms for the avoided
energy costs with NorthWestern estimating these costs to be $40.86 and
MTSUN estimating these costs to be $40.18.49 However, because MTSUN
utilized the “proxy method” and NorthWestern utilized the “peaker
method” for calculating avoided capacity costs, the parties were unable to
agree on the avoided capacity costs.50 Importantly, the proxy method relies
on a future energy resource, whereas the peaker method relies on “the
utility’s [current] least cost resource” in comparing avoided costs.51
At an impasse in negotiations regarding the avoided capacity costs,
MTSUN petitioned the PSC on December 23, 2016 to establish terms for
the PPA between the parties.52
IV. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In its petition, MTSUN requested that the PSC resolve disputes
over NorthWestern’s “obligation to purchase MTSUN’s electric
generation.”53 MTSUN contended that NorthWestern employed tactics to
delay negotiations by not responding to communications from MTSUN as
well as sending highly variable avoided cost estimates.54 MTSUN further
contended that NorthWestern’s actions and avoided cost estimates were
both inconsistent with what PURPA, mini-PURPA, and their regulations
require.55
In July 2017, the PSC issued Final Order No. 7535a (“First Order”)
in response to MTSUN’s petition following a hearing and work session.56
The First Order reconfigured the terms of the PPA so significantly that
even terms the parties essentially agreed upon initially were changed.57
The First Order determined (1) a LEO had not been established; (2) the
correct avoided energy cost was $16.98/MWh, not approximately
$40/MWh as the parties had agreed; (3) the carbon adder calculation
would no longer be considered in avoided cost calculations; (4) the correct

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id. at 1160.
Id.
Id. at 1160–61.
Id. at 1161 (emphasis added).
Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1162.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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avoided capacity cost was $10.53/MWh; and (5) the contract length
needed to be reduced from 25 to ten years.58
Both MTSUN and NorthWestern requested that the PSC
reconsider the First Order, with NorthWestern taking issue with the
contract length, and MTSUN objecting to all five determinations. 59 On
reconsideration, the PSC issued its Order on Reconsideration, Order No.
7535b (“Second Order”).60 The Second Order increased the contract length
from ten to 15 years but left the other determinations in the First Order
untouched.61
MTSUN appealed the Second Order to the Eighth Judicial District
Court, Cascade County, and on June 18, 2019, the district court reversed
the Second Order and remanded it back to the PSC.62 In its order, the
district court instructed the PSC to: (1) assign a 25-year contract length;
(2) assign a carbon adder as calculated by the PSC staff; (3) use December
23, 2016 as the date in which a LEO was established; and (4) calculate the
avoided capacity cost based on an 18 MW internal combustion engine,
consistent with NorthWestern’s 2015 resources plan.63
Following the district court’s decision and a denied request for a
stay by the same court, NorthWestern filed a motion with the Montana
Supreme Court requesting a stay of the district court’s order.64 The Court
denied this motion on grounds that MTSUN would be personally harmed
by the stay, whereas NorthWestern would not suffer irreparable harm if
the stay were denied.65
In response to the district court’s decision, the PSC issued Order
No. 7535c (“Third Order”).66 In doing so, the Third Order recalculated the
avoided capacity costs based on an 18 MW internal combustion engine.67
The Third Order additionally contained a directive to NorthWestern to
include in NorthWestern’s PPA with MTSUN a clause that the PPA is
“terminated or void if the June 18 District Court Order is overturned or
altered in any manner.”68 This clause in the contract, an apparent rebuke
of the district court’s order, essentially had the same effect as a court
ordered stay.69
The PSC and NorthWestern (collectively “Appellants”) appealed
the district court’s decision to the Montana Supreme Court.70 The case was

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1166.
Id.
Id. at 1168.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1154.
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submitted on briefs on January 15, 2020, and decided by the Court on
September 22, 2020.71
V. MONTANA SUPREME COURT DECISION
In reviewing the district court’s decision, the Court determined
whether: (1) the PSC acted arbitrarily and unlawfully in finding that a LEO
was not created; 72 (2) the PSC overstepped its statutorily-provided
authority in dismantling the contract terms agreed to by the parties;73 and
(3) the PSC acted arbitrarily and capriciously in its calculation of the
capacity contribution.74
1.

A. Legally-Enforceable Obligation

In assessing whether a LEO was established, the Court first
determined whether it had jurisdiction over the issue. Appellants
contended the Court lacked jurisdiction to review the PSC’s decision
regarding the LEO. 75 Appellants’ argument rested on a long-standing
PURPA issue that causes confusion for both implementers of the act and
those regulated by it.76 The point of confusion pivots around whether the
challenge involves an implementation challenge or an as-applied
challenge.77 Appellants contended that MTSUN’s LEO complaint was an
implementation challenge, and thus, only federal courts had jurisdiction
over the issue.78
The Court rejected Appellants’ assertion for several reasons. The
Court stated federal courts have determined adjudication at the state level
to be foundational in enforcing rights under PURPA.79 Additionally, the
Court explained that Section 210 of PURPA “provides for state judicial
review respecting ‘any proceeding conducted by a State regulatory
authority’ for purposes of ‘implementing any requirement of a rule.’”80
With support from case law and the plain-language of PURPA itself, the
Court determined that jurisdiction over MTSUN’s LEO challenge was
appropriate.81

71.
Id.
72.
Id. at 1169.
73.
Id. at 1173.
74.
Id. at 1174–75.
75.
Id. at 1169.
76.
Id.
77.
Id.
78.
Id.
79. Id. (citing F.E.R.C. v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 761 (1982);
Portland Gen. Elec. Co. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 854 F.3d 692,
698 (D.C. Cir. 2017)).
80.
Id. at 1169–70 (quoting 16 U.S.C § 824a-3(g)(1) (2018)).
81.
Id. at 1170.
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Next, the Court determined the lawfulness of the PSC’s Whitehall
Wind LEO test.82 This test requires that a QF “‘tender a PPA to the utility
with a price term consistent with the utility’s avoided cost.’”83 The PSC
claimed this requirement is not an insurmountable obstacle to obtaining a
LEO.84
Instead, the Court found that the Whitehall Wind LEO test is not
aligned with PURPA as it essentially requires a QF and utility to be in
absolute agreement regarding avoided cost rates before a LEO is
established. 85 The Court rejected PSC’s interpretation of the Whitehall
Wind test because that interpretation would nullify the policy purpose of a
LEO. The Court reasoned that under this interpretation, utilities would not
be discouraged from bad-faith acts if a LEO is only established upon
complete agreement by the parties.86 The Court was unpersuaded by the
PSC’s argument that “MTSUN was ‘not required to predict the precise
avoided cost’” because MTSUN and NorthWestern were within one dollar
of one another in their proposed avoided energy costs.87
In application of its Whitehall Wind test, the PSC determined that
a LEO was not established because “NorthWestern gave MTSUN several
avoided-cost calculations.”88 In rejecting this argument, the Court relied
on a FERC order that “extensive negotiations between parties are
persuasive” and support a finding that the QF has committed itself to
selling electricity to the utility.89 Further, in a prior decision, the Court
concluded that evidence of a utility’s refused negotiations alone is
insufficient to show a QF’s commitment.90
The Court determined, among other things, MTSUN’s site control,
possession of the necessary permits, initiation of feasibility studies, two
land holdings, performance of an environmental assessment, and
possession of a right-of-way permit showed MTSUN’s commitment to the
proposed project and were sufficient to establish a LEO.91 In addition to
determining that a LEO had been established, the Court deemed the PSC’s
Whitehall Wind LEO test, as applied to MTSUN’s December 23, 2016,
petition to be “unlawful under PURPA, FERC regulations, and Montana’s
mini-PURPA.”92
Under its analysis of the LEO issue, the Court determined that a
LEO was established on December 23, 2016, the date that MTSUN filed
82.
Id. at 1170–71 (referencing Whitehall Wind, L.L.C. v.
Mont. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 347 P.3d 1273 (Mont. 2015)).
83.
Id. at 1171.
84.
Id. at 1170–71.
85.
Id. at 1171.
86.
Id.
87.
Id.
88.
Id. at 1170–71.
89.
Id. at 1171 (citing Cedar Creek Wind, LLC, Commission
Opinion, No. EL11-59-000, 2011 WL 4710848 (FERC Oct. 4, 2011).
90.
Id. (citing Whitehall Wind, LLC. V. Mont. Pub. Serv.
Comm’n, 347 P.3d 1273 (Mont. 2015)).
91.
Id. at 1172.
92.
Id.
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its petition with the PSC.93 Under PURPA’s implementing regulations, a
QF is “entitled to its avoided-cost calculation ‘at the time the obligation is
incurred.’” 94 Ultimately, this means MTSUN is entitled to a 25-year
agreement with an avoided-energy cost rate of $28.68/MWh as well as a
carbon adder of $9.65/MWh.95
B. Contract Terms
The Court next determined whether the PSC acted beyond its
scope of authority in issuing the First Order by effectively dismantling the
parties’ previously agreed-upon contract terms. 96 In Montana, state
agencies are limited to the powers delegated to them by the state
legislature.97
The Court determined the PSC’s dismantling of agreed-upon
contract terms to be “contrary to federal and state law, FERC regulations,
and FERC precedent.” 98 Because FERC prohibits state utility
commissions from creating barriers or disincentives that could deter a QF
and utility from entering into an agreement, the Court found that PURPA
effectively supports the freedom to contract.99 Here, the Court found the
PSC’s altering of agreed-upon contract terms to directly contradict
FERC’s principle that state utility commissions shall not create barriers to
a party’s ability to contract. 100 Allowing the PSC to alter previously
agreed-upon terms would have the practical effect of allowing the PSC to
create the agreement and all of its terms.101
The Court also found the PSC’s dismantling of agreed-upon
contract terms to be inconsistent with the agency’s authority to engage in
quasi-judicial actions.102 Under Montana law, “the PSC’s review is limited
to ‘making determinations in controversies.’”103 Accordingly, the PSC’s
review is restricted “to only those controversies and issues that are
disputed by the parties.” 104 Because neither MTSUN or NorthWestern
disputed the agreed-upon contract terms, the Court determined the agreedupon contract terms were not controversies under Montana law; therefore,
the PSC exceeded its authority in re-writing certain provisions of the
contract.105

93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Id.
Id. at 1172–73 (citing 18 C.F.R § 292.304(d)(2)(ii) (2020)).
Id. at 1173.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1174.
Id. at 1173.
Id. at 1174.
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-15-102(10) (2019)).
Id. (quoting MONT. CODE ANN. § 69-3-603 (2019)).
Id. at 1174.
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C. Capacity Contribution
Finally, the Court determined the PSC acted arbitrarily and
capriciously in its calculation of the capacity contribution. In arriving at
the capacity contribution, the PSC based its calculation on an
aeroderivative unit (“AERO unit”), despite NorthWestern’s next planned
generation unit being three internal combustion engine (“ICE”) units.106
MTSUN contended that by basing the capacity contribution on the AERO
unit, the PSC assumed that NorthWestern would not need additional
capacity until 2025—the time at which the AERO unit would be
available—despite NorthWestern maintaining a 28% deficit at the time of
the Second Order and, therefore, the PSC violated PURPA.107 To support
its reliance on the AERO unit, the PSC claimed the AERO unit was
appropriate because “MTSUN’s solar project cannot perform the same
functions as NorthWestern’s planned 2019 ICE units.”108
When purchasing electricity from a QF allows the utility to delay
“‘the addition of new capacity, then the avoided cost of the new capacity . . .
should be used.’”109 Additionally, under FERC guidance, new capacity is
based on “those resources planned for development contained in
NorthWestern’s integrated resource plan.” 110 Furthermore, FERC has
provided that its regulations guide public utility commissions in
“determining a utility’s avoided cost of acquiring the next unit of
generation.” 111 The Court relied on FERC’s guidance as well as the
Court’s holding in Whitehall Wind, LLC v. Mont. Pub. Serv. Comm’n112 to
determine that the PSC failed “to rely on NorthWestern’s actual and full
avoided costs contrary to PURPA, FERC regulations and precedent, and
this Court’s precedent.”113
Additionally, the Court concluded that “avoided-cost calculations
must be based on NorthWestern’s next planned unit of generation.” 114
Based on the FERC guidance and its own precedent, the Court determined
the PSC acted unlawfully in basing its capacity contribution calculation on
the AERO unit.115 The Court also held that “whether a QF can perform
106. Id. at 1174–75.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 1175 (citing Small Power Producing and
Cogeneration Facilities; Regulations Implementing Section 210 of the
Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, 45 Fed. Reg. 12214, 12216
(Feb. 25, 1980)).
110. Id.
111. Id. (citing California Public Utilities Commission,
Commission Opinion, No. EL10-64-001, 2010 WL 4144227 (FERC Oct. 21,
2010)).
112. Id. (citing 223 P.3d 907, 910 (Mont. 2010) (the Court held
that “avoided costs ‘must be reasonable and based on current avoided least
cost resource data.’”)
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
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exactly the same service of a utility’s next planned generation unit is not a
factor that PURPA requires consideration of in determining avoided costs”
because the performance differences are accounted for “in the avoided
capacity cost payments since MTSUN is only compensated for avoided
capacity costs when it is contributing capacity during NorthWestern’s
peak load hours.”116
The Court affirmed the district court’s decision after finding that
the PSC’s actions while setting MTSUN’s PPA terms were unlawful and,
therefore, arbitrary and capricious at almost every step of the process.117
These actions ultimately had the effect of “deflating the economic
feasibility of MTSUN’s project” which directly contradicts PURPA’s
policy purpose. 118 The Court additionally clarified that “MTSUN is
entitled to the rates and contract terms set forth” in the Court’s opinion.119
VI. CASE ANALYSIS
Less than one month before its MTSUN decision, the Court
decided Vote Solar, a case with many similarities to MTSUN. Taken
together, the cases provide insight into the oftentimes ad hoc, piecemeal
decisions issued by the elected commissioners of the PSC. To fully
understand what these cases say about the PSC, the application of PURPA
in Montana, and the future of renewable energy in Montana, one must first
compare the overlap in the MTSUN and Vote Solar decisions.
A. Comparing Vote Solar and MTSUN
Vote Solar stemmed from a challenge to a PSC order by Vote
Solar and the Montana Environmental Information Center (collectively
“Appellees”).120 Prior to the PSC orders at issue, NorthWestern submitted
its biennial avoided cost application with the PSC, in which it proposed
significant cuts to the standard-offer rates that NorthWestern must pay
small QFs.121 In Order Nos. 7500c and 7500d (collectively “Vote Solar
Orders”), the PSC confirmed NorthWestern’s proposed cuts to the
standard-offer rates for small QFs.122
Appellees contended that in issuing the Vote Solar Orders, the
PSC: (1) “arbitrarily and unlawfully reduced solar QF standard-offer rates
by excluding carbon dioxide emissions costs and NorthWestern’s avoided
costs of operating its internal combustion engine resource units from the
avoided-cost rate;” (2) “arbitrarily and unreasonably calculated solar QF’s
capacity contribution in determining avoided costs;” and (3) “arbitrarily
116. Id. (citing 18 C.F.R § 292.304(e) (2020)).
117. Id. at 1176.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Vote Solar v. Mont. Dep’t of Pub. Serv. Regulation, 473
P.3d 963, 965 (Mont. 2020).
121. Id. at 969–70.
122. Id. at 965.
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and unreasonably reduced maximum-length contracts to 15 years for solar
QFs.”123
Between the two cases, only the issue regarding capacity
contribution calculations was expressly raised in each.124 However, there
is considerable overlap in the PSC’s processes and all of the issues are
closely intertwined, often involving a similar analysis for multiple issues.
The first orders in both MTSUN and Vote Solar were issued by the PSC on
July 21, 2017. 125 Like the First Order 126 and the Second Order 127 in
MTSUN, the Vote Solar Orders focused on: (1) avoided costs; (2) carbon
adder; and (3) contract length.128
In calculating avoided costs, the PSC was mostly consistent in its
orders for both MTSUN and Vote Solar. In both cases: (1) the PSC
calculated avoided energy costs and avoided capacity costs separately
from one another;129 (2) the PSC relied on the AERO unit as opposed to
the ICE units; 130 and (3) the PSC utilized the SPP methodology for
capacity contributions.131 Where the PSC’s orders varied between the two
cases was its calculation of avoided energy costs. The PSC used the peaker
methodology in MTSUN 132 but used the proxy methodology in Vote
Solar.133
In both orders relevant to MTSUN and Vote Solar, the PSC
departed from its own precedent by not using a carbon adder in its avoidedcost calculations. 134 Additionally, the PSC justified its actions in both
cases by explaining “that ‘the political forces that once indicated
environmental regulatory action at the federal level was likely in the
reasonably foreseeable future has diminished and, accordingly, the
likelihood of carbon emissions regulation has decreased.’” 135 The Vote
Solar court found this type of reasoning to be arbitrary because it is not
“technical or scientific knowledge worthy of deference.”136
The third key area of similarity between the two decisions rests in
the contract length determinations. In both MTSUN and Vote Solar, the
PSC’s initial orders cut contract lengths for QFs from 25 to ten years, and
then later increased to 15 years after NorthWestern requested the PSC

123. Id. at 966.
124. Id.; MTSUN, LLC v. Mont. Dep’t of Pub. Serv. Regulation,
472 P.3d 1154, 1158 (Mont. 2020).
125. Vote Solar, 473 P.3d at 970; MTSUN, 472 P.3d at 1162.
126. See MTSUN, 472 P.3d at 1162.
127. See MTSUN, 472 P.3d at 1162.
128. Vote Solar, 473 P.3d at 970–73.
129. Id. at 970–71; MTSUN, 472 P.3d at 1163–65.
130. Vote Solar, 473 P.3d at 971; MTSUN, 472 P.3d at 1165.
131. Vote Solar, 473 P.3d at 971; MTSUN, 472 P.3d at 1164.
132. MTSUN, 472 P.3d at 1163.
133. Vote Solar, 473 P.3d at 971.
134. Id. at 972; MTSUN, 472 P.3d at 1164.
135. Vote Solar, 473 P.3d at 972; MTSUN, 472 P.3d at 1164.
136. Vote Solar, 473 P.3d at 977 (citing Mont. Envtl. Info. Ctr.
v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 451 P.3d 493, 501 (Mont. 2019)).
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reconsider its decision.137 The Court determined that the PSC’s decision
regarding contract length directly contradicted PURPA’s requirements
that “contracts must be long enough to ‘encourage’ and ‘enhance’ the
economic feasibility of QFs.”138
In Vote Solar, the Court affirmed the district court’s decision on
all issues.139 Additionally, although not expressly stated by the Court in
Vote Solar like it was in MTSUN, the Court’s analysis provided the
impression that the methodologies used by the PSC at every step gave the
practical effect of “deflating the economic feasibility” for new QFs in
Montana.140
B. The PSC
Public utility commissions generally vary state-by-state regarding
their composition, authority, and duties. The Montana Code Annotated
entrusts the PSC with the responsibility to “supervise and regulate the
operations of public utilities.”141 The commission’s responsibilities under
this statute have evolved considerably since the early twentieth century
when the PSC’s primary responsibility was regulation of the railroads.142
Today, the PSC still maintains regulatory authority over the railroads, in
addition to its regulatory authority over water, natural gas, and of course,
electricity.143 The composition of the PSC has also evolved significantly
since the early twentieth century. Until 1974, it was comprised of a threemember board chosen by the electorate to serve staggered terms of sixyears.144 Now, the board is comprised of five elected commissioners who
serve four-year staggered terms as officers of the state.145 Commissioners
are limited to two terms (eight years) within a 16-year time span.146
The PSC, by its own account, is one of the smallest government
agencies in Montana.147 Despite its size, the PSC and its commissioners
have received a disproportionate amount of bad publicity in recent years
including a hacked email scandal, absence at PSC meetings,148 and a “hot137. Id. at 972–73; MTSUN, 472 P.3d at 1162.
138. Vote Solar, 473 P.3d at 982.
139. Id. at 983.
140. See MTSUN, 472 P.3d at 1176.
141. MONT CODE ANN. § 69-1-102 (2019).
142. State of Montana, What We Do For You, PUBLIC SERVICE
COMMISSION, http://psc.mt.gov/About-Us/What-We-Do (last visited Oct. 25,
2020).
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. MONT CODE ANN. §§ 69-1-103, 69-1-105(1) (2019).
146. MONT CODE ANN. § 69-1-105(3).
147. State of Montana, supra.
148. Guest opinion: Time for a change on the Public Service
Commission, BILLINGS GAZETTE, (Oct. 23, 2020)
https://
billingsgazette.com/opinion/columnists/guest-opinion-time-for-a-changeon-the-public-service-commission/article_658000ed-06a4-522b-afb339d395cda631.html.
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mic” incident that was openly hostile to renewable energy projects.149 This
“hot-mic” incident involved a recording of Commissioner Bob Lake
(“Lake Recording”) “discussing how a 10-year contract term and low
avoided-cost rate would kill QF development in Montana altogether and
that ‘dropping the rate that much probably took care of the whole
thing.’”150
In addition to the Lake Recording, MTSUN provided the district
court with three op-eds penned by Commissioners Brad Johnson, Roger
Koopman, and Tony O’Donnell. 151 The three pieces were all openly
hostile to solar energy development for QFs. 152 In Montana, as elected
officials, candidates for the PSC run on partisan platforms in the general
election with candidates from each of the two major parties.
Under its statutorily-delegated authority, the PSC has the power
to “adopt reasonable and proper rules relative to all inspections, tests,
audits, and investigations; adopt and publish reasonable and proper rules
to govern its proceedings; and regulate the mode and manner of all
investigations and hearings of public utilities and other parties before
it.”153 Although the statute providing the PSC with its powers expressly
states that the PSC commissioners do not possess judicial powers,154 they
still clearly have significant control over inspections, investigations, and
other proceedings.155
Another key component of the PSC is that the Montana
Department of Public Service Regulation provides staff (“PSC Staff”)
support which includes “economists, accountants, attorneys, rate analysts,
enforcement and compliance personnel, and support staff.”156 As seen in
both MTSUN and Vote Solar, the PSC Staff, comprised of technical
experts, do not share a typical supervisor-subordinate relationship with the
commissioners that some might expect; this disconnectedness allows for
the PSC Staff to provide pushback when it disagrees with the
commissioners without fear of retaliation. 157 Importantly, although the
PSC commissioners are in no way confined by staff recommendations, the
Court in MTSUN did reference the PSC staff memo as a footnote in
supporting its decision.158

149. MTSUN, LLC v. Mont. Dep’t of Pub. Serv. Regulation, 472
P.3d 1154, 1166–67 (Mont. 2020).
150. Id.
151. Id. at 1166; see State of Montana, Commissioners, PUBLIC
SERVICE COMMISSION, http://psc.mt.gov/About-Us/Commissioners (last
visited Oct. 25, 2020).
152. MTSUN, 472 P.3d at 1166.
153. MONT CODE ANN. § 69-1-103(2) (2019).
154. MONT CODE ANN. § 69-1-103(1).
155. See MONT CODE ANN. § 69-3-103(2)(a)-(b).
156. State of Montana, supra note 141.
157. Vote Solar v. Mont. Dep’t of Pub. Serv. Regulation, 473
P.3d 963, 973 (Mont. 2020); MTSUN, 472 P.3d at 1165–66.
158. MTSUN, LLC v. Mont. Dep’t of Pub. Serv. Regulation, 472
P.3d 1154, 1162, n.23 (Mont. 2020).
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C. The Future of Renewable Energy in Montana
In looking at the Court’s decisions in MTSUN and Vote Solar as
well as the inner workings of the PSC, an image of the future of renewable
energy regulation in Montana begins to form. Assuming a similar
composition of both the PSC and the Montana Supreme Court in the years
moving forward, a few key takeaways can be made: (1) the Court provides
a crucial check on the PSC; (2) allowing partisan, elected officials to
regulate the state’s utilities both lends itself to, and encourages politics to
become a pervasive force in the sourcing of Montana’s electricity; and (3)
these cases establish important precedent that constricts the PSC’s
interpretation and application of PURPA, mini-PURPA, and the relevant
regulations for each.
First, both MTSUN and Vote Solar show the role the Court plays
in reviewing the PSC’s actions. As with all state agencies, administrative
appeals of contested cases arising from the PSC’s actions are subject to
MAPA review.159 MAPA provides that the Court must give deference to
agency decisions that are within its statutory authority and wellreasoned.160 It should be noted, however, that the process leading up to the
Court’s review of an action by the PSC is a long one. In MTSUN’s case,
they initiated negotiations with NorthWestern in September 2015, and
officially petitioned the PSC to intervene in December 2016. 161 This
means MTSUN spent roughly four years filing petitions with the PSC,
appealing to the district court, and then fighting an appeal at the Montana
Supreme Court. In addition to the attorney’s fees that MTSUN would have
accrued in that period, MTSUN was likely incurring operating expenses
given its commitment to the project at the time of initiating negotiations.162
Taken together, renewable energy proponents can be hopeful that
the Montana Supreme Court will continue to hold the PSC accountable for
erroneous decisions that negatively impact renewable energy projects.
However, these same renewable energy proponents should be aware that
a significant amount of time may be required before the Court has such a
chance to hold the PSC accountable if litigation is bouncing back and forth
between the PSC and the district courts. Additionally, it is not
unreasonable to think that this time for review could, in and of itself,
render smaller projects economically non-viable.
159. Id. at 1168.
160. Id. at 1168–69.
161. Id. at 1159.
162. See id. at 1172 (“MTSUN . . . had actual site control over
its proposed project areas, had conducted much of the necessary permitting,
had submitted interconnection requests, and initiated feasibility studies for
interconnection. MTSUN had two land holdings, one with a private
landowner and the other with the Montana DNRC. . . . Additionally,
MTSUN completed an environmental site assessment in May 2016,
submitted its FERC form 556, obtained a right-of-way permit from
Yellowstone County, was undergoing the Yellowstone County zoning
compliance permitting process, and had scheduled its certificate of
occupancy construction permit.”).
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Next, the MTSUN and Vote Solar cases in conjunction with the
basic composition and authority of the PSC show the role of politics in
PSC decisions. As noted, the commission is comprised of partisan officials
who are responsive to the constituents of their region. What this looks like
with the current commission is a body of decision-makers who utilize
“arbitrary and unlawful methodologies,” 163 author op-eds directly
opposing solar development, and get caught in “hot mic” recordings
openly discussing ways to kill solar development.164 Although the Court’s
MTSUN and Vote Solar decisions restrict the bounds that the PSC can
work within regarding its decisions, the commissioner’s hostility towards
renewable energy will likely create major roadblocks for renewable energy
development that can only be addressed by the legislature or the electorate.
In the future, this partisanship could pendulum the other way with
renewable energy projects being pushed forward to the detriment of, for
example, coal-produced electricity.
Finally, MTSUN and Vote Solar establish important precedent that
the PSC must follow moving forward in its dealings with QFs. In affirming
the district court’s decision, the Court in MTSUN and Vote Solar
established several important limitations on the PSC’s authority. First, the
PSC must include carbon adder in its avoided cost calculations.165 Because
carbon costs are a cost avoided by the utility when purchasing energy from
a QF, not including the carbon adder would give utilities an artificially low
price. 166 By including carbon adder, QFs receive a more appropriate
rate.167 Second, the PSC’s Whitehall Wind LEO test may no longer be
used.168 This effectively eliminates a major hurdle created by the PSC for
establishing the existence of a LEO. 169 Third, the PSC may not alter
contract terms that the parties have previously agreed to.170 This eliminates
the PSC’s ability to set its preferred terms for every PPA in the state and
allows for freedom to contract among QFs and utilities. 171 Fourth, in
calculating the capacity contribution for determining avoided costs, the
PSC must rely on the utility’s next planned unit of generation. 172 This
allows for a more accurate avoided cost calculation and higher rates to be
paid to QFs from the utilities.173
These four limitations are binding on the PSC; tighten the bounds
within which the PSC is able to interpret and apply PURPA, mini-PURPA,
and the associated regulations; and should tend to limit the PSC’s biases

163. Id. at 1176.
164. Id. at 1166–67.
165. Vote Solar v. Mont. Dep’t of Pub. Serv. Regulation, 473
P.3d 963, 977 (Mont. 2020).
166. Id. at 975–77.
167. Id.
168. MTSUN, 472 P.3d at 1169–73.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 1173–74.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 1174–76.
173. Id.
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toward QFs. The strength of the precedent is further supported by Justice
Rice’s dissent in Vote Solar in combination with his concurrence in
MTSUN.174 In his Vote Solar dissent, he adamantly opposes the position
the Court takes, going so far as to refer to the Court’s review as imposing
“‘judicial rates,’” implying that the Court has overstepped its authority.175
Justice Rice’s MTSUN concurrence, in which he repeatedly asserts stare
decisis as his reason for concurrence, shows the Court’s dedication to stare
decisis.176 The Court’s commitment to recognizing its own precedent will
work favorably for renewable energy projects in the future if the PSC does
not adhere to the precedent established by MTSUN and Vote Solar.
VII. CONCLUSION
MTSUN, LLC v. Mont. Dep’t of Pub. Serv. Regulation provides
important insight into one of the state’s smallest and most obscure
agencies that wields a significant amount of authority and responsibility.
In conjunction with Vote Solar v. Mont. Dep’t of Pub. Serv. Regulation
and a basic understanding of the composition and authority of the PSC,
renewable energy stakeholders should be somewhat optimistic about the
future of renewable energy in Montana. The Court deemed the PSC’s
actions in both MTSUN and Vote Solar to be arbitrary, capricious,
unreasonable, and unlawful. In doing so, the Court has shown that it will
ensure the PSC is compliant with both state and federal laws when dealing
with renewable energy production. These decisions together will rein in
some of the PSC’s ad hoc decision-making, ultimately improve the
economic viability of new QFs, and provide a degree of safety for new
renewable energy projects in Montana.

174. See Vote Solar v. Mont. Dep’t of Pub. Serv. Regulation, 473
P.3d 963, 984–91 (Mont. 2020); see MTSUN, 472 P.3d at 1176–78.
175. Vote Solar, 473 P.3d at 985.
176. MTSUN, 472 P.3d at 1176.

